# Country risk check

A sourced risk profile of one country before you pay, onboard or operate there.

Requires web search, through Exa. Requires web fetch.

## Install

```sh
npx @parcha/agentrun template install github:Parcha-ai/agentrun-templates/templates/country-risk@242f29da8317fbe51d0cce4628bdb5ab61d7ccc9 --trust
```

Or open `<your AgentRun address>/#/templates/install?src=github%3AParcha-ai%2Fagentrun-templates%2Ftemplates%2Fcountry-risk%40242f29da8317fbe51d0cce4628bdb5ab61d7ccc9`. Pinned to commit 242f29da8317fbe51d0cce4628bdb5ab61d7ccc9.

## What it does

A sourced risk profile of one country before you pay, onboard or operate there. It covers sanctions programs under each regime that applies to you, FATF status, the EU high-risk list, corruption and AML indices, political, payment and transfer risk, each from its primary source with a date, and suggested controls for your context.

- Skill `country-risk`: Build a sourced risk profile of one country or territory. Check each sanctions regime in scope at its primary source, the latest FATF plenary outcome, the EU high-risk third-country list, the Basel AML Index, TI's CPI and the World Bank governance indicators with editions and dates, then political, payment, transfer and data-localization risk, a rating and controls tied to the business context. Use for "country risk", "is it safe to pay suppliers in", "sanctions check on a country".

## What starts it

- By hand, any time: from the console, the API or the CLI.

## Inputs

| Name | Type | Required | What it is |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `country` | string, 2 to 120 characters | yes | The country to profile. A territory or region is profiled as itself, with how sanctions programs treat it. Example: `Kenya`. |
| `business_context` | string, 0 to 400 characters | no | What you are doing there: paying suppliers, onboarding customers, entering the market. It sets the emphasis and the controls. Blank: a balanced profile. Example: `Paying software contractors monthly`. |
| `regimes` | list of string | no | Blank: UN, US (OFAC), EU and UK. Example: `US OFAC,UK OFSI`. |

## What it needs

- Harness: pi, claude-agent, codex
- Model: balanced tier, medium effort
- Tools: read, web_search, web_fetch
- Computer: Wherever your AgentRun puts a new agent
- Keys: A model key
- Learning: off

## Sample output

Input:

```json
{
  "content": "Today is 2026-11-14. Run a country risk check. We would be buying agricultural produce from a supplier there.\n\nThe two pages below have been captured for you; use them in place of fetching them, and fetch other primary sources\nnormally.\n\n<captured-page url=\"https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/ukraine-russia-related-sanctions\" captured=\"2026-11-14T10:00:00Z\" untrusted>\n<h1>Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions</h1>\n<p>Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014, \"Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions\nWith Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine\", prohibits new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a United\nStates person, and the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services or technology\nfrom the Crimea region, as well as exportation to the region, among other prohibitions. Executive Order 14065 of February\n21, 2022 imposes similar prohibitions on the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic regions.</p>\n</captured-page>\n\n<captured-page url=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/crimea-sevastopol/\" captured=\"2026-11-14T10:01:00Z\" untrusted>\n<h1>Crimea and Sevastopol: EU restrictive measures</h1>\n<p>In response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, the EU applies restrictive measures under Council\nDecision 2014/386/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014, including an import ban on goods originating in Crimea or\nSevastopol, restrictions on trade and investment in certain sectors, and a ban on supplying tourism services. The\nmeasures are renewed annually; the current renewal runs to 2027-06-23.</p>\n</captured-page>",
  "country": "Crimea",
  "regimes": [
    "US OFAC",
    "EU"
  ]
}
```

Output:

#### Bottom line
**Assessment: prohibitive for the contemplated Crimea-origin procurement where the stated US or EU import prohibitions apply. Hold contracting and payment.** Crimea is assessed as a territory, including Sevastopol, rather than substituting Russia-wide or Ukraine-wide conclusions. Both regimes impose separate territorial restrictions [S1][S2].

**US OFAC:** importing Crimea-origin produce into the United States, directly or indirectly, is prohibited absent applicable authorization. The supplied source also prohibits US-person new investment and exports to Crimea. It does not establish the legality of every offshore purchase or payment [S1]. **EU:** the supplied Council source states a ban on importing Crimea/Sevastopol-origin goods; treat the contemplated EU import as prohibited absent a confirmed applicable exception or authorization [S2]. Neither extract establishes an agricultural import exemption. Buying food is not, by itself, a clearance.

The supplier's location and the goods' actual growing origin must be distinguished. Buyer jurisdiction, destination and payment chain are unknown. This is not legal advice; the controls below are considerations for compliance and legal functions.

#### Sanctions
| Regime | Program and scope | Key limits | Source/date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US OFAC | Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions; comprehensive territorial restrictions under EO 13685, dated 2014-12-19 | Source prohibits imports into the US, directly or indirectly, of goods from Crimea, plus specified investment/export activity | [S1], captured 2026-11-14; latest amendment unconfirmed |
| EU | Crimea/Sevastopol measures; broad import and sectoral restrictions under Decision 2014/386/CFSP and Regulation 692/2014 | Source states an origin-based import ban, sectoral trade/investment restrictions and tourism-services ban | [S2], captured 2026-11-14; renewal stated through 2027-06-23 |

#### AML and corruption indicators
| Indicator | Status or score | Edition/date | Stale? |
|---|---|---|---|
| FATF increased monitoring | Unconfirmed; primary page returned 403 | Statement identified as 2026-10-30 [S5] | No by identified date; body unverified |
| FATF call for action | Unconfirmed; attempted primary page returned 403 | October 2026 attempted [S6] | Publication date unverified |
| EU AML high-risk countries | Current annex/status unconfirmed | Retrieved extracts insufficient [S7][S11] | Unknown |
| Basel AML Index | Crimea score/rank not confirmed | 2025 Public Edition [S8] | Publication date unknown |
| TI CPI | Crimea score/rank not confirmed | 2025; release 2026-02-10 [S9] | No |
| WGI: stability, corruption control, rule of law | Crimea values not confirmed | 2026 edition; data through 2025 [S10] | Exact publication date unknown |

Country-level indices are not presented as Crimea-specific measurements. Missing values are not favorable findings.

#### Political and payment risk
**Assessment:** legal permissibility comes before payment feasibility. No bank or correspondent route has been verified; bank acceptance would not override sanctions [S1][S2]. Capital controls, FX availability, refunds/repatriation, SWIFT access and localization obligations remain unconfirmed.

FCDO advice updated 2026-10-02 advises against all travel to Crimea and describes continuing attacks affecting Ukrainian infrastructure. Assessment: inspections, logistics and delivery continuity face substantial risk [S3]. The attempted independent US advisory check returned 403 [S4].

#### Controls
- **Enhanced:** hold the transaction pending written US/EU sanctions analysis.
- **Enhanced:** independently verify farms, growing origin, title and transport records.
- **Enhanced:** establish any exact authorization and screen ownership, counterparties, banks and logistics providers.
- **Enhanced:** if legally permitted, obtain fully disclosed bank-route acceptance and enforceable origin/termination protections; avoid unsecured prepayment.

#### Open questions
Establish buyer nexus, destination, actual origin, ownership and banking chain before commitment. Recheck restrictions before shipment/payment and monitor the stated EU renewal deadline, 2027-06-23 [S2].

#### Gaps
FATF bodies were inaccessible; EU AML list content and territorial index values were not established. Monetary-authority and data-law verification remains outstanding. Unknown publication dates prevent reliable staleness conclusions. The supplied sanctions extracts are authoritative captures but are not complete consolidated legal or licensing reviews.

## Tested

Passes 4 of 4 eval cases on pi, 2 of 4 on Claude Code and 4 of 4 on Codex. Not yet tried on the live web.

4 eval cases: injection-in-page, not-a-country, stale-and-context, territory.

## Source

- Package: https://github.com/Parcha-ai/agentrun-templates/tree/242f29da8317fbe51d0cce4628bdb5ab61d7ccc9/templates/country-risk
- Publisher: Parcha-ai
- Author: Parcha Labs
- Version: 0.1.0
- License: Apache-2.0
- Category: Compliance
- Page: https://marketplace.agentrun.ai/templates/country-risk/
